Abstract: Several misbehavior detection and reputation systems have been proposed for mobile ad-hoc networks, relying on direct network observation mechanisms, so-called watchdogs. While these approaches have so far only been evaluated in simulations and restricted to selfish packet dropping, we are interested in the capabilities of a watchdog detection component in a real network. In this paper we present our test-bed implementation of misbehavior detection. Following an evaluation of both the feasibility and detectability of attacks on routing and forwarding in the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol, we present the design of our test-bed. In order to add detection capabilities, we extend the concept of passive acknowledgment by mechanisms for partial dropping, packet modification, and fabrication detection. We combine DSR with Netfilter and APE to enable detection. We implement both attackers and detection and show their feasibility and limitations. 
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Introduction
We are interested in the attacks on routing and forwarding in mobile ad-hoc networks. Specifically, we want to determine whether and how attacks can be mounted and detected by observation in a real network environment.
Several reputation-based systems to deal with misbehavior in mobile ad-hoc networks have been proposed, all relying on some component to detect misbehavior in the neighborhood of a node. To the best of our knowledge, so far, the evaluation of detection has been restricted to simulations and only to the misbehavior type of not forwarding packets not destined to one self. Even for the detection of this simple attack, some concerns have been raised [11] whether it is unambiguously feasible to classify it as such.
Our approach is to build a test-bed that can be used to test attacks as well as whether they can be detected, and thus study the practicality and feasibility of several reputation- based misbehavior detection systems. We make the test-bed freely available and open source.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
1. We provide a systematic list of attacks on DSR and evaluate the effort and gain for mounting them as well as whether and how they can be detected.
2. We extend the notion of passive acknowledgment to enable the detection of attacks.
3. We built and present here a test-bed that enables researchers to assess the feasibility and detectability of attacks.
4. We implemented and tested several attacks and showed their detection.
5.
We compared the performance of DSR enhanced by our extended passive acknowledgment detection mechanism to regular DSR. We found that it performs at least as well as explicit acknowledgment, but mitigates the problem of duplicates due to lost acknowledgments.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 we give some brief background information on Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and passive acknowledgment, since we investigate attacks on DSR and detect them by means of an enhanced passive acknowledgment. We describe our detection mechanism by enhanced passive acknowledgment in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss the feasibility and detectability of attacks on DSR. We describe the design and architecture of our test-bed in Section 5, followed by a description of the attacks we implemented in Section 6. We discuss the use of our test-bed and further work in Section 7. Then we discuss related work in Section 8, and Section 9 concludes the paper.
Background
Dynamic Source Routing
Misbehavior detection systems for mobile ad-hoc networks have mostly built on Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), monitoring node behavior with a watchdog component. DSR is a protocol developed for routing in mobile ad-hoc networks and was proposed for MANET by Broch, Johnson and Maltz [5] . In a nutshell, it works as follows: Nodes send out a ROUTE REQUEST message, all nodes that receive this message forward it to their neighbors and put themselves into the source route unless they have received the same request before. If a receiving node is the destination, or has a route to the destination, it does not forward the request, but sends a REPLY message containing the full source route. It may send that reply along the source router in reverse order or issue a ROUTE REQUEST including the route to get back to the source, if the former is not possible due to asymmetric links. ROUTE REPLY messages can be triggered by ROUTE REQUEST messages or gratuitous. After receiving one or several routes, the source picks the best (by default the shortest), stores it, and sends messages along that path. In general, the better the route metrics (number of hops, delay, bandwidth or other criteria) and the sooner the REPLY arrived at the source (indication of a short path -the nodes are required to wait a time corresponding to the length of the route they can advertise before sending it in order to avoid a storm of replies), the higher preference is given to the route and the longer it will stay in the cache. In case of a link failure, the node that cannot forward the packet to the next node sends an error message toward the source. Routes that contain a failed link, can be 'salvaged' by taking an alternate partial route that does not contain the bad link.
Passive Acknowledgment (PACK)
During packet forwarding every node is responsible confirming that the packet was received by the next hop. There are three ways to get this acknowledgment, as specified in the DSR draft [5] :
1. Link-layer acknowledgment: this is supplied by the MAC layer (IEEE 802.11b supports it).
2. Passive acknowledgment: this confirmation comes indirectly by overhearing the next node forward the packet.
3. Network-layer acknowledgment: this is when nodes explicitly request a DSR acknowledgment from the next hop.
PACK can be used for Route Maintenance when originating or forwarding a packet along any hop other than the last hop. PACK cannot be used with the last hop since it will never retransmit a packet destined to itself. PACK needs two conditions to be applied: nodes have their network interfaces in promiscuous mode, and network links operate bidirectionally.
PACK works as follows. When a node receives a packet to be forwarded to a node other than last hop, the node sends the packet without requesting a network-layer acknowledgment (ACK). If it doesn't overhear the retransmission of the next node within a timeout, the node retransmits the packet again, without network-layer ACK request. After a certain number of trials, a network-layer ACK request must be used instead of PACK for all remaining attempts for that packet.
When a node receives a new packet, it considers it as a PACK if the following checks succeed:
1. Source address, destination address, protocol identification and fragment offset fields in the IP header of the two packets must match.
2. If either packet contains a DSR Source Route header, both packets must contain one, and the value in the Segments Left field (it indicates the number of hops remaining until the destination) in the DSR Source Route header of the new packet must be less than that in the first packet.
Enhanced Passive Acknowledgment: More Watchdog Capabilities
In addition to the normal use of PACK, we benefit from the promiscuous mode and added more tests to detect attacks, thus increasing the capabilities of a watchdog component. Since the packets sent are logged in a queue waiting to be acknowledged by PACK, it is straightforward to check some additional fields to detect misbehavior in the flow of packets.
Thanks to the bi-directionality of the link-layer (IEEE 802.11b), a node is able to find out whether the next node forwards its packet if both nodes are still in the range of one another. This is possible because the node receives the packet in promiscuous mode when the next node forwards it. If it does not overhear the packet forwarded, it means that the next hop either did not forward it or that it did forward it but it was not overheard because the next-hop node moved out of range just after receiving the packet to be forwarded. With the PACK retransmission mechanism, the node waiting for the PACK resends the packet. If it does not get acknowledged, it emits a route error claiming that the next node is unreachable.
When a node promiscuously overhears the forwarded packet, it can additionally check whether it has been modified, and if so, whether the modifications result from a normal behavior or not.
The DSR draft [5] gives the fields we must check in order to consider the packet we receive as a PACK. By checking the four fields of the IP header, we can identify a packet uniquely so that we are sure we overheard one retransmission of the packet we forward. Next, the DSR draft requires that if both packets have a source route option, then the segments left value in the overheard packet must be less than in the logged packet. This last check assures that the overheard packet is fresher than the logged one.
In practice, however, most Linux versions now sometimes set the IP identity field to zero for security reasons. This means for the use of passive acknowledgment, that if we want to identify packets uniquely, we have to use other pieces of information. We propose two solutions to this problem. The first is to generate a random identity number in the case when it has been set to zero. Note that changing the identifier from zero to a randomly chosen number does not violate IP identifier semantics. The second is to use the data contained in the packet to uniquely identify it, without modifying the IP identity. We only need to identify the packet uniquely if there is a need for retransmission and there would be several packets eligible. For our purpose of detection of partial dropping, it suffices to know that a packet was dropped that belonged to a particular path, regardless of which packet it was exactly in the sequence.
Most operating systems increment a system-wide IPID value for each packet they send. Others, such as OpenBSD, use a random IPID and some systems (like Linux) use an IPID of 0 in many cases where the "Don't Fragment" bit is not set. Windows does not put the IPID in network byte order, so it increments by 256 for each packet. Nmap also has categories for constant, random positive integral, and unknown sequence classes.
In order to implement the added watchdog capabilities to detect some attacks or events, we enhanced the passive acknowledgment we added to piconet so that every packet is completely checked for changes when we identify it as a passive acknowledgment. Thus, if the attacker changes one of the four IP fields we use to identify a PACK the regular PACK was not able to use our detection capabilities. We check the following fields and log if one of them changes:
1. IP header: The TTL value must be decremented by only one.
2. Route reply option(s): All fields.
3. Route error option(s): All fields. 5. Forged route error: a node can detect it, if the unreachable address in the route error option is its own.
This new functionality detects the changes well. It detects all the attacks we implemented that are based modifications in the header, as described in Section 6.
Note that although IEEE 802.11b supports link-layer acknowledgments that, if implemented, can be used instead of passive acknowledgement to make sure that the next hop received the sent packet, it cannot serve as a basis for detecting misbehavior in the sense of attacks described below.
Attacks on DSR
In the following we give examples of attacks on DSR and classify them as dropping, modification, fabrication, or timing attacks. We also state their potential detectability.
Dropping Attacks
Drop all packets not destined to itself or perform only partial dropping. Partial dropping can be restricted to specific types, such as only data packets, or route control packets that contain it, or packets destined to specific nodes. The attacker can also decide to drop only some of the packets listed above. The previous hop can detect dropping by use of passive acknowledgment.
Avoid sending a ROUTE ERROR when having detected an error, to prevent other nodes from looking for alternative routes. Thus, the source of the data packet will not know that this route is disrupted and will not initiate a Route Discovery to find another route. By using fake data packets sometimes, the initiator could confirm the validity of the route if it receives a reply to this fake packet from the destination which cannot interpret the data. To the previous hops using passive acknowledgment this looks like dropping packets and can thus be detected as misbehavior.
Modification Attacks
By sending forged routing packets, an attacker can create a so-called black hole, a node where all packets are discarded or all packets are lost. If the attacker itself is the black hole and then just drops the packets, this can be detected by the neighbors using passive acknowledgment. If the black hole is a virtual node or outside the network, it is hard to detect. The attacker could also cause the route at all nodes of an area to point into the black hole area when the destination is outside the network. This could be done by sending forged ROUTE REPLY messages for example. The attack of using an unreachable node as a black hole is not easily detectable since the last node on the route that could not reach the destination will send a ROUTE ERROR back. If the attacker drops the ROUTE ER-ROR, this can be detected. Otherwise, the source node will initiate another route discovery process and the attacker will go undetected.
Attempt to make routes that go through oneself appear longer by adding some virtual nodes to the route. Thus, a shorter route will be chosen avoiding this node. When the attacker receives a ROUTE REQUEST, it replies with a ROUTE REPLY as if the route were already in its route cache, but it adds some virtual nodes to make the route longer. It could also modify (add some virtual nodes) and forward the ROUTE REQUEST. As the ROUTE REPLY comes back, it removes the virtual nodes and forwards the packet. By use of enhanced passive acknowledgment to detect tampering, adding nodes can be detected. In the same way, an attacker can remove itself to be avoided, this can also be detected by passive acknowledgment.
Change the Last Hop External flag in the ROUTE RE-PLY to make this route less interesting for the initiator of the route discovery. This modification can be detected by enhanced passive acknowledgment.
Salvage routes that are not broken and redirect a data packet to consume bandwidth and energy, or to deviate traffic for malicious purposes. When the attacker receives a data packet, it changes the route of the packet and also sends a ROUTE ERROR to the source to indicate the change of route. Thus, the source will delete the original route of its cache and will use the new route next time. It can potentially be detected when the next hop overhears the ROUTE ERROR containing itself.
To create a routing loop, an attacker on the path could send forged routing packets that cause packets traversing nodes in a cycle without reaching their destination, consuming bandwidth and power. This could be detected if nodes check for loops in the source route not only when forwarding a ROUTE REQUEST. If, however, the attacker manages to use two different addresses for one node, it is not detectable from inspecting the header.
Modify the nodes list in the header of a ROUTE RE-QUEST or a ROUTE REPLY to misroute packets and to add incorrect routes in the route cache of other nodes. The attacker could add, remove or change any node in the header of the packet, disturbing route discovery and causing nodes to misroute packets. This attack could be detected by the previous node by means of enhanced passive acknowledgment.
Decrease the hop count (TTL) when receiving a packet, so that the packet will never be received by the destination. This attack could be detected by the previous node in route by enhanced passive acknowledgment.
Fabrication Attacks
An attacker could forge ROUTE ERROR packets causing nodes to incorrectly remove working routes from their route cache. In the worst case, this attack could prevent a node from being able to route any packets. Every time a node receives a ROUTE ERROR, it must remove this route from its route cache and broadcast this information to its neighbors. The difficulty for the attacker is to emit a ROUTE ERROR for a route that exists in the Route cache of the victim. The attacker must take part to the route too, otherwise it could not send this ROUTE ERROR without suspicion. This attack is difficult to detect for the nodes that are not mentioned in the ROUTE ERROR, since it is not possible distinguish a normal gratuitous ROUTE ERROR from a forged ROUTE ERROR.
Send spoofed ROUTE REQUESTs with subsequent sequence query id, so that the next ROUTE REQUESTs from the spoofed node will be discarded by the nodes since they already saw them. No ROUTE REPLY will come back since the destinations do not exist. Thus, when the victim will initiate new ROUTE REQUEST, nodes will discard them because they have already seen the same originating adress associated with the same id. Its detection is limited to the spoofed node when it receives a ROUTE REQUEST supposedly originated by itself and to nodes appearing in the route that have not received the request before.
Forge ROUTE REPLY packets causing nodes to misroute packets and to add incorrect routes in their route cache. The nodes that overhear it must update their route cache. Thus, they will misroute packets and consume energy and bandwidth. This is hard to detect.
Initiate frequent ROUTE REQUEST to consume bandwidth and energy and to cause congestion. The attacker could initiate ROUTE REQUEST for the same destination or for another destination every packet. Since ROUTE REQUEST are broadcast, it costs a lot of bandwidth and energy. In the first case, the event cannot be seen as a normal event. In the second case, there is an uncertainty over the behavior of the node.
Timing Attacks
Send route replies with a time not proportional to the length of the route. This can give more priority to long routes thus attracting routes to the attacker, or less priority to short routes thus avoiding the attacker. It is easy to mount. It can be observed when nodes wait for several routes to arrive and checking their length before adding them to the route cache.
Test-Bed Design Overview
Our test-bed consists of several components. Whenever possible, we used components that are already publicly available and serve at least part of our purposes. We then proceeded to integrate the components by means of utilities that we modified to provide the functionalities we need and to glue the parts together.
The resulting architecture can be seen from Figure 1 . We describe the use and integration of the main components in detail in a technical report [4] and just list them briefly, stating the main points, in the following.
A Linux
2. The APE testbed [1] for scripting and mobility, and to integrate our distribution to be booted from CD. We integrated piconet and made it usable with APE. APE provides some facilities to lead real world multi-hop wireless tests. Deployment of the tests is facilitated by the possibility to use a bootable CD-ROM or a package on a Linux or Windows machine. Scripted scenarios enable people to physically carry out the experiments without prior instruction. Instructions are displayed on the laptops so that the tests could be easily reproducible. There is a possibility to add more routing protocols using scripts that initialize and cleanup sessions. Centralization of logs is done in a Master/Slaves architecture. This simplifies the post-analysis of the logs (e.g. synchronization). Visualization of node placements and movements can be done using a Java interface. This tool uses the radio signal strength (superspy) to build the map of nodes. Analysis tools are also provided to retrieve some basics metrics like virtual movement, data loss rate or path optimality. Mobility can be emulated by the mackill function which blocks out MAC addresses. It is extensible and based on a Linux environment. More details can be found in [13] .
3. Netfilter [18] for capturing packets in promiscuous mode. We patched it so that it could handle packets promiscuously received using a new hook. When the interface is in promiscuous mode, it keeps all the packets it could overhear on the network. But, netfilter drops the promiscuously received packets before they could be caught by any hook, so that it was impossible to process these packets within the netfilter framework. Since keeping the same global architecture was the easiest solution, we patched [21] netfilter to make it able to handle promiscuous traffic. This patch adds a NF IP PROMISCUOUS hook that catches all packets promiscuously received. With this improvement at hand, it was feasible to implement PACK over piconet.
4. PCMCIA card drivers pcmcia-cs for Linux, which we patched to enable promiscuous mode. The existing monitor mode was not enough to enable passive acknowledgment, because it does not allow nodes to send packets while monitoring.
The setup for our experiments consists of 3 Pentium II laptops, 233 MHz, Linux kernel 2.4.19, APE 0.4, Redhat 7.2, and 1 Pentium IV laptop, 2.20 GHz, Linux kernel 2.4.20, Debian 3.0r1(woody). For all laptops we used Orinoco Classic Gold 802.11b cards, 11 Mb/s, driver pcmcia-cs-3.2.1 (orinoco 0.11b driver included).
Attacks Implemented in the Test-Bed
Choice
After testing the PACK implementation we added to piconet, we focused our attention on attacks that could be detected by adding more watchdog capabilities in our implementation. We kept three types of attacks: header modification, partial dropping, and sending forged route error messages.
Header modification
6.2.1. Selfish attacks First, we modify the PACK piconet in order to implement some selfish attacks that will help the attacker saving power. We keep three different modifications.
1. Last Hop External: We change this flag in the route reply option to make this route less interesting for the initiator of the route discovery. If it receives more than one route, it must prefer the ones that have this flag set to zero. This is done just by changing the value of rtreply->lasthopx in the proc_rt_reply_opt function if we are not the destination of the packet. We do the same for the Last Hop External and First Hop External fields in the source route option.
2. Removing itself from the route reply option: If a node removes its own address from the route reply option, it will not take part of the route and save power. To implement this, we add some code in the proc_rt_reply_opt function that looks for the address of the node itself, removes it and appends the addresses following it. It changes the blank line at the end of the route reply option to a PADN option.
3. Route error modification: If a node finds a route error option in the header, it modifies it in a selfish way. It changes the error source address to the address of the next-hop and the address of the unreachable node to its own, so that the next hops will remove it from their route cache. We add this attack in proc_rt_err_opt since it will modify a packet that includes a mandatory source route option.
Test-bed results:
We investigate how these modifications work in a real environment:
1. Last Hop External: Since piconet does not deal with this flag when determining the best route, this attack has no effect on the routing. 
Route error modification. The modification works and
the receiver has to delete the route, thus avoiding the attacker.
Malicious attacks
Then, we add some others attacks that can be mounted by altering the header. These attacks will not help the attacker saving power, but only disrupting routes. We test the following:
1. Source route option altering: a node changes its address in the source route option so that the next hops will add an incorrect route in its route cache. This attack is implemented in the proc_src_rt_opt function.
2. Error destination address altering: A node changes the Error Destination Address in the route error option to discard route errors. When the destination of the route error will receive the packet, it will not be processed and the route will not be deleted.
Test-bed results:
1. Source route option altering: This attacks works in our simple test environment. The answer of the destination of the modified packet never arrives. So that, this node must initiate a new route discovery process since he has no other route to destination.
Partial Dropping
This attack consists of dropping an arbitrary packet at a constant rate. The attacker will drop this packet whenever it is resent. To implement this attack, we add a new drop_q that keeps a log of the packet we drop. Whenever a packet is caught by the NF_IP_PRE_ROUTING hook, we first check if this packet has already been dropped using the check_drop function. In this case, we drop it again. Then, the packet enters the drop_packet function that checks if the packet must be dropped or not. In this case, we add the packet in the drop_q queue so that we could identify it later when it is resent.
Test-bed results:
This attack works well in our tests. We use a rate of one drop every ten packets. The previous hop detects the drop when the PACK timeout expires. It resends the packet that will be dropped again by the attacker and emits a route error after the explicit ACK timeout. Without link-layer acknowledgments, we have no reliable way to detect if the packet was lost because the next hop went out of range or dropped it intentionally. A heuristic, however, is that if subsequently a packet originating from the next hop is overheard, the node is in the range.
Fabrication of Forged Route Errors
An attacker could forge ROUTE ERROR packets causing nodes to incorrectly remove optimal routes from their Route cache. In the worst case, this attack could prevent a node from being able to route any packets. In our test implementation, we just emit a forged route error whenever the identification value in the IP header is a multiple of 3 and the packet includes a source route option.
Test-bed results:
The attack works well in our environment. The source of the packet removes this route from its route cache and starts a new route discovery process. This attack can be detected when the next hop overhears the forged ROUTE ERROR that corresponds to a packet it just received. If the attacker does not forward the packet, it will be detected by the previous hop using passive acknowledgment.
Test-Bed Discussion and Future Work
Contrary to concerns raised against the watchdog to correctly detect packet dropping [11] , the attacks we implemented were indeed detected successfully by use of our enhanced passive acknowledgment. The concerns were that for instance the partial dropping attack could lead to false conclusions in the case of ambiguous or receiver collisions. In all of our experiments, even with very high traffic load, we never experienced a single collision. Another potential objection to the effectiveness of a watchdog for the detection of dropping is that nodes could use power ranges just large enough to reach the previous hop but not the intended next hop if it is further away. This is very difficult to achieve, the power range adaptation in current off-the-shelf cards is not very precise, additionally nodes would constantly have to find out their distance to their neighbors that are potentially mobile.
Since we rely only on acknowledgments, passive or explicit, to send error messages and we currently have no linklayer notification in case a link breaks, a node moving out of range cannot be distinguished from a node that drops packets instead of forwarding them. This has to be taken into account when fixing thresholds for misbehavior detection.
The implemented attacks and their detection worked in all the experiments, therefore it would make little sense to show graphs on that. What is more illustrative is the performance of the network with our enhanced passive acknowledgment in place and compare it to the regular implementation with explicit acknowledgment, to see whether it has an impact on throughput, loss, and delay. The enhanced passive acknowledgment takes more computation due to the effort of overhearing, comparing and added checks for modification. On the positive side, however, passive acknowledgment does not need to send extra packets for acknowledgment and thus reduces the traffic. As exemplified by Figure 2 showing small packet size and 3 with large packet size, we found that the network performance was as least as good as when using regular explicit acknowledgment, sometimes even better. Even at very high traffic load, the computational overhead did not have any detrimental influence, and using passive acknowledgment mitigates the problem of duplicates that arise due retransmissions of packets that successfully arrived but the acknowledgments were lost. In the experiment shown, we had the laptops topology aligned in a row to enforce multi-hop forwarding. We varied the packet size, the number of pings, and the preload, i.e. how many packets are sent in a first burst. The figures show an average over ten runs, the standard deviation was very small in all cases, the bars are absent when no loss occurred. We compared the original piconet implementation which uses explicit acknowledgments without retransmission, to versions modified by us, namely explicit acknowledgments with retransmission, and passive acknowledgment. Note that the loss rates might depend on the idiosyncrasies of the machines and drivers used, so we do not claim generality of these results. In the same vain, we observed that both the round-trip time of pings and the total time taken for batches of pings are reduced using passive acknowledgment, we are currently investigating the reasons for this, such as the role of the time it takes to send explicit acknowledgments and premature rerouting attempts in the case of no retransmissions.
In our experiments we set the timer for the passive acknowledgment to 100 ms. The timer is set when sending a packet and expires only if the packet has not been overheard being sent by the next-hop node. We found in all our experiments that the actual time to overhear was below 10 ms, even in the case of high traffic load. We therefore deem the expiry time of 100 ms more than sufficient, it can even be reduced if necessary.
We have implemented both attacks and their detection. In order to render misbehaved nodes harmless, this detection has to be followed by a response, the most effective being isolation. Our test-bed can be extended by mechanisms to disseminate the detection information gained by use of our enhanced passive acknowledgment. This information can then serve as an input to a reputation system to serve as a basis for decision making on a suitable response. The response itself can then also be added to our test-bed to evaluate its effectiveness in a real environment.
Although we intend to use the test-bed to implement our own reputation system based mechanism, we envision its use also for the community to evaluate different protocols. We are in the process of making our code and detailed methodology public, so that the test-bed can be used to investigate both potential attacks and countermeasures.
Related Work
Detection
In this section we describe several approaches that build on the detection of misbehavior in mobile ad-hoc networks and could thus benefit from our test-bed to evaluate the effectiveness of attacks and their detection.
Watchdog and path rater components to mitigate routing misbehavior have been proposed by Marti, Giuli, Lai and Baker [11] . They observed increased throughput in mobile ad-hoc networks by complementing DSR with a watchdog for detection of denied packet forwarding and a path rater for trust management and routing policy rating every path used, which enable nodes to avoid malicious nodes in their routes as a reaction.
Intrusion detection for wireless ad-hoc networks has been proposed by Zhang and Lee [22] to complement intrusion-prevention techniques. The authors argue that an architecture for intrusion detection should be distributed and cooperative, using statistical anomalydetection approaches and integrating intrusion-detection information from several networking layers. They use a majority voting mechanism to classify behavior by consensus. Responses include re-authentication or isolation of compromised nodes.
CONFIDANT proposed by Buchegger and Le Boudec [3] detects misbehaving nodes by means of observation or reports about several types of attacks and thus allows nodes to route around misbehaved nodes and to isolate them from the network. Nodes have a monitor for observations, reputation records for first-hand and trusted second-hand observations, trust records to control trust given to received warnings, and a path manager for nodes to adapt their behavior according to reputation.
CORE, a collaborative reputation mechanism proposed by Michiardi and Molva [12] , also has a watchdog component; however it is complemented by a reputation mechanism that differentiates between subjective reputation (observations), indirect reputation (positive reports by others), and functional reputation (task-specific behavior), which are weighted for a combined reputation value that is used to make decisions about cooperation or gradual isolation of a node.
A context-aware inference mechanism has been proposed by Paul and Westhoff [14] , where accusations are related to the context of a unique route discovery process and a stipulated time period. A combination is used that consists of un-keyed hash verification of routing messages and the detection of misbehavior by comparing a cached routing packet to overheard packets.
OCEAN by Bansal and Baker [2] relies exclusively on first-hand observations for ratings. If the rating is below the faulty threshold, the node is added to the faulty list. This faulty list is appended to the route request by each node broadcasting it to be used as an avoid list. A route is rated good or bad depending on whether the next hop is on the faulty list. In addition to the rating, nodes keep track of the forwarding balance with their neighbors by maintaining a chip count for each node.
Cross-feature analysis is proposed by Huang, Fan, Lee, and Yu [7] to detect routing anomalies in mobile ad-hoc networks. They explore correlations between features and transform the anomaly detection problem into a set of classification sub-problems. The classifiers are then combined to provide an anomaly detector. A sensor facility is required on each node to provide statistics information.
Security in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks
Secure routing approaches have been mainly proposed as modifications to existing routing protocols such as DSR [8] and AODV [15] . They aim at securing the routing messages by cryptographic means to prevent misbehavior by malicious nodes rather than detecting it once it has already happened. Although this preventive approach is so far limited to routing and thus is not directly related to forwarding misbehavior as described in this paper, we briefly discuss some of the proposals. SRP, the Secure Routing Protocol by Papadimitratos and Haas [17] , guarantees correct route discovery, so that fabricated, compromised, or replayed route replies are rejected or never reach the route requester. SRP assumes a security association between end-points of a path only, so intermediate nodes do not have to be trusted for the route discovery. This is achieved by requiring that the request along with a unique random query identifier reach the destination, where a route reply is constructed and a message authentication code is computed over the path and returned to the source. The correctness of the protocol is proved analytically.
ARIADNE, a secure on-demand routing protocol by Hu, Perrig, and Johnson [6] , prevents attackers from tampering with uncompromised routes consisting of uncompromised nodes in the route discovery phase. It is based on Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and relies on symmetric cryptography only. It uses a key management protocol called TESLA that relies on synchronized clocks. Simulations have shown that the performance is close to DSR without optimizations. Ariadne does not protect against an attacker that is on the route.
ARAN by Sanzgiri et al. [19] uses digital signatures at each hop to secure route discovery and error messages in route maintenance. Digital signatures make sure that modification, impersonation, and fabrication attacks are detected. This solution is proposed for a managed ad-hoc network, i.e. with a certification authority available.
Test-Beds and DSR implementations
Since to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first testbed targeted at misbehavior detection in mobile ad-hoc networks, we could only build on parts of other solutions. We evaluated several existing test-bed environments and implementations of DSR in view of what they provide to enable the detection of misbehavior. The criteria were that it had to be a real network, support promiscuous mode, support DSR, support passive acknowledgment, preferably have logging and scripting facilities, and it had to work on current offthe-shelf hardware such as available network cards.
Specifically, we considered APE [1], MobiEmu [23] , the Monarch DSR implementation [10] , Click [9] and the pecolab DSR implementation [16] , and the piconet DSR implementation [20] .
In comparison to the alternatives, the APE testbed combined with the piconet implementation of DSR fulfilled the largest range of our requirements. We integrated them and added capabilities as described in Section 5.
Conclusions
In the quest for a real network evaluation, we modified and integrated several components to form a test-bed suitable for the investigation of the feasibility of both misbehavior attacks and their detection on mobile ad-hoc networks. We built the test-bed, implemented several attacks, and demonstrated their effectiveness. We enhanced the passive acknowledgment mechanism, where nodes overhear the transmission of neighboring nodes to verify the reception of packets, to allow for the detection of a range of attacks. We built this extended passive acknowledgment for detection into the test-bed and evaluated its capabilities.
Watchdogs, as detection components for mobile ad-hoc networks have been called, as implemented in our extended passive acknowledgment mechanism can indeed detect a number of attacks on mobile networks such as packet dropping, and several types of packet modification and fabrication. The capabilities of watchdogs are most limited in the case of packet fabrication.
We propose our test-bed for the use of the community to evaluate attacks, detection, reputation, and response mechanisms.
